For you
Following
Web3 mobile games
B
BullBX @k_trejk · 20h
VERCEL GOT HACKED ShinyHunters – the group behind the Ticketmaster breach – is selling Vercel's internal database for $2M on BreachForums here's why every developer should care: - they have NPM tokens and GitHub tokens - Vercel owns Next.js – 6 million weekly downloads - one Show more

Vercel April 2026 security incident

status page · vercel.com/incidents
Unauthorized access detected
We identified an incident involving unauthorized access to certain internal systems. A limited subset of customers may be affected.
Timeline
Apr 18 — initial detection
Apr 19 — access revoked
Apr 20 — investigation ongoing
Scope
• Internal tooling access
• Subset of tokens rotated
New Topic Reply Search

[SELLING] Vercel.com & Next.js DB dump — 17 Apr 2026

by ShinyHunters · Moderator
Posts: 402 · Threads: 88
Hello Breached,

Selling an internal database dump
originating from vercel.com systems.

Contents:
• NPM publishing tokens
• GitHub integration tokens
• Customer project metadata
• Deployment secrets (subset)

Price: $2,000,000 USD — XMR only
Escrow accepted via moderator.
216
1.7K
2M
Vercel @vercel · 21h
We've identified a security incident that involved unauthorized access to certain internal Vercel systems, impacting a limited subset of customers. Please see our security bulletin: vercel.com/kb/bulletin/ve…
298
6.3K
2M
0xDailyLongs reposted
T
Tay 🫡 @tayvano_ · 7h
its a pretty good hack ngl 😁 Rather, the attacker was able to gain access to the list of RPCs per DVN uses, compromise two of them – which were independent nodes running on separate clusters without direct connection to each other – and swap out binaries running the op-geth nodes. Because of our least-privilege principles, they were unable to compromise the actual DVN instances. However, they used this pivot point to execute an DVN-specific attack. Their malicious node used a custom payload designed explicitly to bypass the two DVNs with minimal warnings. The message was only shown to the DVN while the node explicitly told the truth to any other IP addresses that made RPC requests, including our Scan service that would index all the information about the attack to all our internal observability infrastructure. This was carefully designed to prevent any security monitoring from noting anomalies from what external RPCs were reporting. It was designed to self-destruct once the attack could no longer be performed, disabling the RPCs, deleting the malicious binaries and corresponding local logs and config.
L
LayerZero @LayerZero_Core · 8h
Layer Zero.
423
1.2K
422K
Ritdube reposted
b
banteg @bantaq · 5h
layerzero attack was not rpc poisoning in networking poisoning is when the attacker outside the trust boundary taints a shared lookup (dns, arp, cache). the consumer has no reason to distrust the source. this was not that. the attackers got inside layerzero's trust boundary. Show more
87
245
49K
Grok @grok Ad
Question? Grok has the answer. Try SuperGrok today for free.

Time to upgrade

Unlock SuperGrok — faster answers, image generation, and advanced reasoning.